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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is far too early to understand the vast number of effects of the May 1, 2004 expansion of the 
European Union, especially when considering democratic legitimacy, language policies and 
linguistic diversity. But there are at least two linguistic issues within the academic literature that 
seem to have already become clear: one has to do with the permanency of the official and 
working languages framework and the other issue concerns how to understand the spread of 
English and its meaning for suprastate democracy.   
 
Prior to this most recent expansion, several scholars argued that it would be almost impossible to 
alter the official languages framework of the EU whereby one major language of each member 
state becomes an ‘official and working’ language of the EU’s institutions, equal, at least 
officially, to all the rest.  They argued that it does not matter how cumbersome and expensive 
such a multilingual regime might be. Because the Treaty of Rome stipulates that the language 
policies of the institutions must be decided unanimously by the Council of Ministers coupled 
with the symbolic importance of language means that the 1958 regulation making Dutch, French, 
German and Italian ‘official and working languages’ with equal status became the unassailable 
model whereby every member state’s major language becomes and ‘official and working’ 
language of the EU (Loos 2000, Krauss 2000, and De Swaan 2001: 167-71).   
 
The increase from 11 to 20 official and working languages lends further support to this argument 
especially the specific situation of Maltese that will be discussed below. Here I will argue that 
expansion raises the tension between whether the EU celebrates linguistic diversity in general or 
just the limited diversity of the ‘official’ EU languages. This latter situation can fall easy prey to 
critics who see ‘official’ language status as merely symbolic, overly bureaucratic and wasteful.  
This ‘official’ version of multilingualism may be seen not as an integral element of democratic 
representation but instead be merely the outcome of the crass politics of federating nation-states 
of vastly different sizes.2  In order to adequately justify EU multilingualism, its rationale from a 
democratic perspective must match how it operates. The most recent expansion suggests the 
opposite may be happening. And this, I will argue, is important for the real and perceived demo-
cratic process of the EU. 
 
The second, related, argument is about the prevalence of academic arguments specifically in 
favour of adopting English as a lingua franca. The implication is that an increase in the number 
of official EU languages complements the continued spread of English – as Abram De Swaan 
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phrases it, “the more languages, the more English.” Moreover, there is an implicit or explicit 
position that this posses no problems for the development of democracy at an EU level. Many 
argue that the spread of English is not a challenge to EU multilingualism, both official and 
quotidian.  To take just one example, Philippe Van Parijs argues that English should be adopted 
as Europe’s lingua franca because “we need a way of communicating directly and intensively 
across the [nation-state] borders drawn by the differences of our mother tongues, without the 
extremely expensive and constraining mediation of competent interpreters. We need it in 
particular if we do not want Europeanisation, and beyond it globalisation, to be the exclusive 
preserve of the wealthy and the powerful who can afford quality interpretation.” (Van Parijs 
2004: 117).3 More descriptive and ‘objective’ assessments less concerned with justice and 
fairness as Van Parijs also paint a picture of the inevitable dominance of English that seems 
irrational to resist.  Whereas before 2000, there was relatively scant academic work in this area, 
especially from political scientists, now such literatures are burgeoning and this specific line of 
argument is one prominent theme. 
 
This article argues that many such arguments that support the adoption of English as a lingua 
franca for Europe utilize a rarified notion of language that ignores the history of language within 
the rise of the modern nation-state and democracy. If the decision to adopt English as a lingua 
franca results from forces outside democratic will formation, it will only exacerbate the 
democracy deficit. Moreover, since the mid-1990s, the EU has been increasingly adopting 
policies that celebrate and foster linguistic diversity – however vague or ineffectual they might 
be.  Some of these policies are the outcome of processes that are at least struggling to be 
democratic and related to questions of human rights, overcoming ‘democracy deficits’ and voter 
malaise.  In other words, while some scholars and the EU Treaties themselves tend to downplay 
the tensions around the possibilities of suprastate democracy and language, these challenges 
seem to be at the heart of the European project.  As Robert Phillipson argues, “Uncertainty about 
supranational language policy reflects uncertainty about the type of political entity that the EU is 
evolving into, and the relative fragility of channels of communication uniting people and civil 
society beyond national borders” (Phillipson 2003: 13). 
 
CONTEXT 
 
In 1993, Abram de Swaan described the process and debates on European integration like this: 
 
There was much talk of milk pools and butter mountains, of a unitary currency, of 
liberalizing movements of EC citizens and restricting access for outsiders, but the 
language in which these issues were dealt with remained itself a non-issue. (De 
Swaan 1993: 244) 
 
He noted in both 1998 and 2001 that this situation had not meaningfully changed. The second 
part of this paper will address the rise, since about 2000, of academic interest in language and the 
European Union, especially from political scientists. De Swaan was clearly correct that in the 
1980s and early to mid-90s, those who studied language in Europe were mostly linguists, 
sociolinguists, or historians and not political scientists or policy analysts. As De Swaan notes, 
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political scientists and the large field of European integration was quite slow to address the 
language issues.   
 
This pattern seems to mirror the EU’s own silence about language policy followed by more 
recent explicit statements that endorse ‘linguistic diversity’ – although the actual meaning of this 
concept remains vague.  Since its beginnings in 1957, what developed into the EU has restricted 
its explicit language policy to its own institutions and their workings.  It had officially left the 
field of language to the jurisdiction of its member states (Phillipson 2003: 9-10; Truchot 2003: 
101-2; Ives 2004: 26-37). Moreover, the language policies of the institutions such as the 
European Council, the Commission and the Parliament were understood as separate and 
separable from general language policy.  It was not until the late 1990s that the wider impacts of 
the EU’s language policies were recognized. 
 
However, since before Maastricht, programmes on education and culture entered the domain of 
quotidian language use of European citizens. Programmes concerning education, such as Lingua 
started in 1989 and Erasmus that began in 1987, were aimed at foreign language teachers and 
students studying in other EU countries, respectively, and thus entered the realm of language 
policy.  Moreover, their explicit goals were to enhance the knowledge not of all languages in 
Europe, but of the ‘official’ EU languages.4  Since the late 1990s, the EU has become 
increasingly explicit about its commitment to fostering multilingualism and knowledge of 
‘Europe’s’ languages.  These goals are now understood as inextricable from essential elements of 
European integration, including mobility and political identity. (Phillipson 2003: p.4: Truchot 
2003: 106). 
 
 
THE AMBIGUITY OF LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY 
 
The relatively recent trend to celebrate and help foster Europe’s linguistic diversity has added to 
the ambiguity around what ‘linguistic diversity’ means and the justifications for why it should be 
celebrated.  It is even unclear which languages count as ‘Europe’s languages’. The Socrates 
Programme is quite interesting in that in phase 1 (1995-1999) it was restricted to official EU 
languages. Applicants to the programme explicitly noted that funds for components of the 
projects in languages that are not ‘official’ must come from elsewhere. Socrates phase 2 (2000-
2006), however, includes languages other than ‘official’ EU languages (Ives 2004: 40). But this 
trend of an opening up of what constitutes ‘linguistic diversity’ is presented in a rather vague and 
unclear fashion. I’ll give two examples. The first is again from the Socrates Programme.   
 
The Decision establishing phase 2 of Socrates states as one of its measures the “promotion of 
language skills and understanding of different cultures.”  There is no clarification or restriction to 
define these different cultures as the cultures of the majority communities in member states (OJ 
2000: 3). Whereas the initial goals of the programme are slightly more clearly restrictive, “to 
promote a quantitative and qualitative improvement of the knowledge of the languages of the 
European Union, in particular those languages which are less widely used and less widely 
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taught, so as to lead to greater understanding and solidarity between the peoples of the European 
Union and promote the intercultural dimension of education” (OJ L028 3.2.2000: 1, emphasis 
added).  Here linguistic diversity is narrowed to the ‘languages of the European Union’ but it is 
unclear whether this means ‘official languages’ or any language autochthonous to European 
Union member states, or any language used by a considerable number of people inside the EU, 
which would then include Hindi, Arabic and Chinese. Interestingly enough, in its application, 
Socrates phase 2 includes Icelandic which, arguably, does not fit any of the above categories, but 
not Hindi.  The unstated assumption presumably has something to do with the historical roots of 
Iceland and Icelandic in Europe. But such presumptions have ambiguous implications that are 
not necessarily democratic.  Socrates 2 does include Turkish.   
 
The second example of ambiguity over the meaning of ‘linguistic diversity’ comes from the new 
proposed Constitution. In one sense, the Constitution just combines the existing Treaty 
arrangements regarding official and working languages. However, in so doing, it perhaps 
potentially changes the official and working language structure by introducing a new 
designation, ‘languages of the Constitution’. These are the ‘official and working languages’ plus 
Irish. In the text, Irish is no different from any of the other ‘languages of the Constitution,’ 
leading some activists in Ireland to renew calls for it to be made an official EU language.  In 
practical terms, does this include Turkish which is an official language of Cyprus, as will be 
discussed below, and the mother tongue of well over two million residents of Germany. 
 
It is also important to see how it frames how the “Union will respect its rich cultural and 
linguistic diversity ...”(Article I-3).  Article III-182, paragraph 2a calls for the EU to have a role 
in “developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and 
dissemination of the languages of the Member States.”  Again, it is unclear whether this means 
the ‘official’ EU languages or autochthonous European languages, or any languages used by a 
sizeable community within EU members.  It also states that in “fulfilling the objective of 
respecting the Union’s rich cultural and linguistic diversity as set out in paragraph 3 of Article I-
3” translations of the Treaty [i.e. the Constitution] into “any other languages as determined by 
the Member States among these which, in accordance with their constitutional order, enjoy 
official status in all or part of their territory” will be certified and archived by the Council 
(Article IV-10, paragraph 2). 
 
Thus, it appears that the proposed Constitution of the European Union includes only the ‘official’ 
or ‘Constitutional’ languages, and not even all official state languages, let alone languages that 
are the primary language of millions of EU citizens but not state-languages. This raises a 
significant question as to what is the democratic justification for this conception of linguistic 
diversity.  If this is the case, the critics of the EU’s multilingualism have a much stronger case in 
that it is not based in democratic values but instead in the history of political negotiations with 
little over arching rationale. However, there seems to be a growing trend within the EU to 
celebrate linguistic diversity and expand its meaning in a direction that does address questions of 
democratic representation. 
 
Given the trend towards recognizing the importance of linguistic diversity as seen in the changes 
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to Socrates between the 1st and 2nd phases noted above, the 2001 Year of Languages, 26 of 
September Day of Languages and the like, it is not surprising that the 2004 expansion from 15 to 
25 member states increased the number of official languages from 11 to 20.  Each new member, 
with the exception of Cyprus, added a new ‘official and working’ language to the EU 
constellation.  However, this increase in number of translations is exponential dictated by the 
formula: n2 - n where n is the number of languages.  This yields a total number of language pairs 
prior to the latest expansion of 112 - 11 = 110 and now 202 - 20 = 380.  As of May 1, 2004, there 
are more than three times as many language pairs that require translation to and from.  This is 
clearly why there was speculation prior to expansion that either the general framework would 
break down or at least a language like Maltese would be given the status of Irish, Letzeburgesh 
or Catalan which have some recognition but not equal status.  The major Treaties, for example, 
have official Irish translations, but not other legislation.  This was not the case however, and 
Maltese became an EU language on par with the other 19. 
 
The importance of Maltese becoming an ‘official and working’ language of the EU is not 
‘merely’ symbolic but has economic and social repercussions for Malta.  Joseph Eynaud, Deputy 
Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Malta, explains that this is a “unique opportunity 
and a historical moment” for the Maltese language. He explains that “Malta never had the 
tradition of having specific courses for translators and interpreters.... Usually, we used to 
translate in other foreign languages like from English into French or Italian and never into 
Maltese.” Thus, the status of official EU language for Maltese creates a need for Maltese 
interpreters and translators and the creation of a whole field of study and learning.  (Eynaud 
quoted by Camilleri 2004; see also MaltaMedia News 2004 and SCIC News Newsletter Nr. 27, 
May 2004 at http://scic.cec.eu.int/scicnews/2004/040610/news03.htm).  Moreover, this includes 
the development of software and terminology databases that had not existed for Maltese before.  
This work on what sociolinguists call ‘corpus planning’ was a major element of language 
‘standardization’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of languages like French, German 
and Italian.   
 
Eynaud argues that “Democracy ... is also about multilingualism and the right for everyone to get 
one’s message through in one’s own native tongue...  I think some people in Malta still have a 
colonial mentality. This is a historical occasion where the Maltese language is a European 
language.  We should be proud of this.”  He is concerned that this new status of Maltese will not 
automatically produce the results that he hopes for. Unless these new courses in interpretation 
and translation produce qualified professionals and if the Maltese MEPs do not use Maltese, 
there is a likelihood of a “reverse back to Strickland days when English was the elite language 
and Maltese the il-lingwa tal-kcina (language of the kitchen).” (As quoted in MaltaMedia News 
2004). 
 
This situation seems to throw the fact that Irish and (perhaps more importantly from a numeric 
standpoint at least) Catalan, Welsh or other minority languages do not have full ‘official and 
working’ language status into greater relief.  If Maltese, with 383,000 speakers, has this status, 
why not Turkish or Welsh? 
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Thus, where much of the other news media, especially in England and the U.S., is touting the 
expense and difficulties associated with this new need for translation and interpretation (Black 
2004; Dombey 2004; Underhill 2004) the opportunities that it may open are important and also 
being phrased in terms of democracy and democratic rights.    
 
The issue of the entrance of Cyprus is perhaps a more complex issue that lies beyond the scope 
of this article. However, it does raise one clear point and question about the ‘official and 
working’ languages of the EU.  As it stands, Cyprus was the sole new member that did not add a 
language to the EU language regime.  These negotiations are notoriously closed, but presumably 
the precedent that was followed was that of Austria whose major language, German, had already 
been an official EU language before Austria entered.  Likewise for Cyprus, Greek has been an 
EU language since Greece’s entrance in 1981.  This, of course, ignores the question of Turkish.  
Article Three of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus declares both Greek and Turkish to 
be the official languages of the Republic, with no distinction made between them.  It was 
assumed that had the April referendum reuniting Cyprus (the Kofi Annan plan for unification) 
been accepted, Turkish would have become an EU language.  This would not only have had an 
effect for those Turkish speaking Cypriots, but also the much more numerous Turkish speakers 
elsewhere in the EU especially Germany.  However, this was not to be the case. 
 
Had the negotiations been focused on a future reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, one might have expected Turkish to become the 21st EU language. Moreover, had the 
rationale behind the EU’s multilingualism been a need to respect cultural diversity or the 
democratic need for citizens to be able to communicate with the institutions that governed them 
democratically, one would have thought the large number of Turkish speakers in the EU would 
have helped Cyprus press for Turkish to be the language that its entrance would have added to 
the language constellation. As it stands, Turkish speakers throughout Europe will have to wait 
until Turkey’s candidacy is accepted before Turkish becomes an official EU language.   
 
Both these cases, Malta and Cyprus, show that the one member, one language model is difficult 
to justify on the criteria that the citizens of nation-states should be able to communicate with the 
democratic institutions that govern them.  This is primarily because it relies on the overly 
simplistic premise that the nation-state members have a single language that its citizens speak.5 
 
ENGLISH AS A LINGUA FRANCA AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY 
 
I will now turn to two specific examples of this growing field of analysis by political scientists 
on the role of language in the EU, the work of Abram De Swaan and Philippe Van Parijs.  De 
Swan’s 2001 book Words of the World has a chapter devoted to the European Union.  The entire 
book is based on developing the work of Immanual Wallerstein’s world system theory in the 
realm of language and various language constellations throughout the world.  He attempts to map 
the relation of languages and their speakers to one another categorizing them as ‘peripheral 
languages’, central or ‘planetary’ languages, ‘supercentral languages’ and then the category 
made up only by English, the ‘hypercentral’ language.  He adds to this world systems theory of 
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language model a quantitative and rational choice theory approach to analyze why people choose 
to learn the languages they do. Working through economic concepts, he defines language as a 
‘hypercollective good’ and then applies a quantitative measure of a Q-value to each language.  
The Q-value is the measure of the communicative potential of a language. So it is an attempt to 
go beyond just measuring a language by the number of speakers who use or know it, or learned it 
as a mother tongue. Rather a Q-value is “the product of the proportion of those who speak it 
among all speakers in [their language] constellation and the proportion of multilingual speakers 
whose repertoire includes the language among all multilingual speakers in the constellation.” (De 
Swaan 2001: 21). Thus, he approaches language learning from the perspective of individual 
rational actors and assumes that people will choose to learn the language with the larger Q-value, 
or the larger communicative potential.  This model, he argues, is successful at explaining why 
English became dominant in India whereas in Indonesia bahasa Indonesian triumphed.  He 
applies the Q-value framework to two regions in Africa and also South Africa as well as the 
European Union. 
 
His findings on the EU are perhaps not surprising.6  He argues that English has by far the highest 
Q-value and thus, people are learning English and rationally they will continue to which will 
increasingly function as EU’s lingua franca.  But he also predicts that because the other national 
languages, especially French, German, Italian and Spanish, have such strong support through 
national education policies, etc..., that they will continue to be strong and robust ‘supercentral’ or 
‘central’ languages.’  Indeed, relative to the other languages that he looks at, many of which are 
‘peripheral’ languages, there is little cause for concern about the increase of English as a lingua 
franca.  Moreover, by pitting the tension in an easy contrast between “maintaining a multiplicity 
of languages and improving communication in the Union”, he implies that the increase of 
English as a lingua franca has definite advantages for the EU and its prospects for a vibrant 
democracy (De Swaan 2001: 173). As he sums up in the subtitle to his chapter on the EU, ‘the 
more languages, the more English.’   
 
Before commenting on De Swaan’s approach and findings, I’ll summarize the quite different 
arguments of Philippe Van Parijs that yields some similar outcomes, specifically, the emphasis 
on the inevitability of English as a lingua franca and the problems that this solves for democracy 
because democracy requires communication among citizens for which linguistic diversity is a 
barrier. Van Parijs has written five articles and book chapters since 2000 on language in the 
European Union. I certainly cannot do them all justice here, but will highlight one specific theme 
that runs through them all.   
 
Unlike De Swaan, Van Parijs is specifically focused on linguistic justice and redressing linguistic 
injustice. While he agrees with De Swaan about the inevitability of the spread of English and its 
usefulness as a lingua franca, he is much more concerned with its costs and other injustices as 
well.  Many of his most interesting and provocative points are attempts to reconcile what he sees 
as both the unavoidable fact that English is becoming Europe’s lingua franca and what he calls 
the ‘wisdom’ of making such a decision with the equally clear fact that it is unfair and unjust 
(Van Parijs 2004: 124). Like De Swaan, Van Parijs borrows heavily from both rational choice 
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theory and economics to argue that English speakers gain disproportionately from the adoption 
of English as a lingua franca and non-English speakers who pay an unfair price in the time and 
resources it takes to learn English as well as the on-going difficulties of perhaps not speaking as 
well or as comfortably as mother-tongue speakers. 
 
Van Parijs makes creative recommendations such as the banning of dubbing, making sure 
English language material on the internet is not restricted (i.e. not enforcing any form of 
intellectual property rights), and take ownership of English as a global language not the property 
of England or the US (Van Parijs 2004). He also argues that “ritual, sometimes ceremonial, 
affirmation of the equality of all recognized languages” is important (Van Parijs 2004: 143) and 
echoing Jean Laponce’s argument, that national languages need to remain “King,” as he puts it, 
in a defined territory (Van Parijs 2004: 143-5). He also argues provides a qualified argument in 
favour of granting non-English languages strong laws within given territories (i.e. “impos[ing] 
public education in local languages...”, “impos[ing] the use of local languages in the political 
realm...” and “impos[ing] administrative and judiciary procedures in local languages”).(Van 
Parijs, 2004: 145). 
 
But what shapes all these proposals is his commitment to the position that English should be 
adopted as Europe’s lingua franca because “we need a way of communicating directly and 
intensively across the [nation-state] borders drawn by the differences of our mother tongues, 
without the extremely expensive and constraining mediation of competent interpreters.  We need 
it in particular if we do not want Europeanisation, and beyond it globalisation, to be the exclusive 
preserve of the wealthy and the powerful who can afford quality interpretation.” (Van Parijs 
2004: 117). 
 
Here I will just make two objections that apply to both De Swaan and Van Parijs analyses. The 
first has to do with the inevitability of the spread of English and its use as a lingua franca (the 
connection between these two propositions should really be analyzed in greater detail, but this is 
not the time) as well as its connection to democracy and democratic process. I do not want to 
argue for or against the wisdom or justice of adopting English as a lingua franca. Rather, I want 
to ask that such decisions be made by a process that is as democratic as possible. De Swaan and 
Van Parijs would perhaps note that individuals choosing which language to learn is a democratic 
process.  But this would be to ignore the context and constraints under which individuals make 
such decisions.  It would be to treat language as a private good not a public or ‘hypercollective’ 
good as both De Swaan and Van Parijs agree it is.  In other words, it seems to me that if we want 
to use this terminology of ‘goods,’ language’s status as a collective entity places it in a category 
where we choose to learn it under very special conditions such as schooling systems and 
especially our notions of political community.7  To make this point allow me to digress a little. 
 
In 1868, one of the most famous modern Italian writers, Alessandro Manzoni, was appointed 
head of a government commission to spread ‘standard’ Italian throughout the newly unified 
country of Italy.  Had he adopted the explanatory methods of De Swaan and Van Parijs, or their 
assumptions about language and how people come to learn langauges, the Italian language and 
perhaps Italy, would look quite different than it does today. Most historian of the Italian 
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language estimate that at that time somewhere between two and ten percent of Italians could 
speak or understand anything that could be considered ‘Italian.’ (De Mauro 1986; Moss 2000).  
But rather than ask what language these new Italian citizens would rationally choose to learn as 
autonomous, individual rational choice actors, Manzoni set about turning the spoken bourgeois 
dialect of Florence into the ‘standard’ language of the nation.   
 
Manzoni not so much ‘standardized’ Italian as actually created a national language that was 
related to, but certainly not synonymous with, the literary Italian of the great tradition of Italian 
writers from Dante forward.  Just as he had done with his classic novel, The Betrothed, Manzoni 
created a new national language by taking the spoken language of bourgeois Florence as a model 
for all of Italy. Under his plan, dictionaries and grammars were created and perhaps most 
importantly as we think about the EU’s programmes like Socrates and Leonardo, the school 
teachers for all of Italy were to be recruited from Tuscany.  There is debate about the extent that 
the actual creation of a standard Italian followed his plan, how much the standard language was 
actually changed and whether military service and later the radio and TV had greater impact.8   
 
My point is that the crucial development in most European nation-states included a language 
policy that cannot be explained or understood from a rational choice individualistic perspective.  
The ‘inevitability’ of a national Italian language had little to do with the types of assumptions De 
Swaan and Van Parijs are making about language change and democracy, and everything to do 
with the model set by other European nation-states, most notably France and England.  Both De 
Swaan and Van Parijs seem to use an individualistic rational choice model to explain away rather 
than explain the spread of English.  Their analyses become part of the self-fulfilling prophecy 
since at the individual level one is only reasonable if she conforms to what she is being told is 
inevitable anyway.  This is most obvious in how the media interpreted the 2001 Eurobarameter 
survey of languages in the EU. As I have noted elsewhere, the Economist translates the data that 
41% of non-British EU citizens ‘know’ English into the statement “English is the EU’s lingua 
franca... the European mother tongue.” (as discussed in Ives 2004: 37-8). 
 
No such analysis would have lead a Sicilian to learn ‘standard’ Italian in 1870, or predict that 
such a language would emerge. Rather, in both the 19th century Italian case and our contem-
porary European case, the explanations have much more to do with the social frameworks 
(schools, businesses, newspapers, etc....) and the political decisions that help structure the 
language or languages in which they operate.  These decisions can be less democratic (as in most 
of the cases in 18th and 19th century European nation-states) or more democratic (as some of the 
decisions about EU language policy seem to be heading). That is not to say that the analyses of 
De Swaan and Van Parijs do not lead to some useful findings. First off, they have been important 
in placing language politics in a more prominent place.  Secondly, they break down the stalemate 
between linguistic parochialism (and its worst variation, linguistic nationalism) and a naive 
approach to language as purely a vehicle of communication (see Ives 2004a). Thirdly, they 
provide some important analytical concepts for thinking through language issues.  However, my 
concern is that they do not grapple with the actual complexity of what language is and how it 
relates to democracy. 
  10 
10 
 
This is one reason why I am much more concerned with the EU as a potential model for other 
supranational democratic organizations. And this is why its pronouncements on the importance 
of linguistic diversity in the face of a globalizing English seem to me to be more than just ‘ritual’ 
or ‘symbolic’ statements. 
 
My second point is more of a question.  It seems to me that the rise of an unprecedented modern 
democracy in 18th and 19th century Europe went hand in hand with a dramatic linguistic shift 
from a hierarchy of different languages and dialects for different spheres of life but also different 
social classes.  Most of the major ideologues committed to forging modern nation-states were 
convinced of the need for national languages often for military and economic reasons as well as 
democratic and social ones. The question that I think is not being posed, and is actually obscured 
by the work of many political scientists who are finally turning to the question of language in the 
EU is this: does this new shift to democracy above the level of the nation-state also entail a 
different role for language within democratic institutions? 
 
In Umberto Eco’s insightful work, The Search for the Perfect Language, he notes how strong the 
sentiment found in Genesis 11 is, that linguistic diversity is a ‘curse’ and a ‘barrier’ to com-
munication. These presumptions are also found in how both De Swaan and Van Parijs describe 
linguistic diversity. By tracing various attempts to find the perfect language in the hope of 
returning human kind to pre-Babelian times, Eco undermines the very premise of such a quest 
and instead suggests that we would do better to look to Genesis 10 where linguistic diversity is 
described in a less loaded manner as the mere result of migration across the globe, not God’s 
punishment of human hubris.  While I have problems with his specific descriptions of a polyglot 
Europe (Eco 1995: 351; see Ives 2004c: 97-9), it leads me to wonder whether the model of 
translation and interpretation that is just being forged in the EU has more important resonances.  
Rather than presume, as Van Parijs makes explicit in the passage quoted above, that a single 
language will enable seamless democratic communication, should we not be realizing that one of 
the many benefits of linguistic diversity is precisely that it calls our attention to the constant need 
for translation.  Translation among languages becomes a framework and metaphor for translation 
among diverse communities with differing values and views of the world, for the very type of 
‘solidarity’ that Van Parijs has written so much about. 
 
                                                 
 1 This paper was presented at “Multiple Diversities: European Experiences / Diversités 
multiples: Les expériences européennes” held by the Consortium for European Studies 
(Université de Montréal and McGill Univeristy), Montreal, Oct. 1, 2004.  I would like to thank 
the participants, especially Isabelle Petit and Barbara Thériault.  I also with to thank Peter Mayo 
at the University of Malta and Paul Willetts who carried out research on related topics under my 
supervision of the University of Winnipeg Undergraduate Student Research Award in the Human 
Sciences. 
 2 So for example, Danish and now Maltese have ‘official and working’ language status 
within the EU and Turkish, for example does not.  The fact that there are many more Turkish 
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speakers than Danish or Maltese in the EU has been irrelevant.  Moreover, the prevalence of 
English as a second language in Malta relative to say Turkish speakers in Germany makes the 
question of citizen’s language rights and political representation even more pronounced. 
 3 Claude Truchot discusses the various costs involved noting that even the estimation that 
translation and interpretation accounts for 2% of the total EU budget is probably too high 
(Truchot 2003: 109). 
 4 I have argued elsewhere that the official and working languages regime does have an 
impact on language usage outside the EU institutions themselves, such as in the Socrates 
programmes (Ives 2004: 33-7). 
 5 Further complicating such issues is the situation where the EU views language rights 
and the suppression of language as a human rights issue.  The Turkish governments repression of 
the Kurdish language is often raised as one of the human rights issues that is an obstacle to its 
entrance into the EU.  In a similar but different way, the EU has been quite concerned with the 
suppression of Russian within Latvia. 
 6 For a critical review of De Swaan see Robert Phillipson 2004 forthcoming. 
 7 My point is captured well by Will Kymlicka and François Grin when noting the neglect 
of language by liberal theory such as John Rawls, “One explanation for this suprising omission is 
that language turns out to be rather embarrassing for liberals.  Issues of language cannot easily be 
accommodated within the standard framework that liberals adopt for dealing with diversity.” 
(Kymlicka and Grin 2003: 8). I would argue that this framework includes those fields of 
economics that both De Swaan and Van Parijs draw heavily.  
 8 Moreover, Graziadio Isaia Ascoli and Antonio Gramsci were very critical of this 
method arguing not only that it would be ineffective but worse that by forcing what was in 
essence a foreign language on especially southern Italians would exacerbate political tensions 
between north and south.  See Ives 2004b: 36-62. 
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